A secret document released on 30th June 2010 by the ongoing Iraq Inquiry's chair, Sir John Chilcot, shows that early legal advice given to the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was unequivocally definitive in saying that any proposed war in Iraq would be "Unlawful" on all grounds.
The basis of war, or more accurately "use of force" could only be based on three premises:
1. Self-defence
2. Exceptionally, the avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or
3. Authorisation by the UN Security Council.
The then, Attourney General, Lord Goldsmith, advised that:
"regime change may follow from a legitimate use of force but cannot of itself be justification for military action".
In plain language, to start a war on the basis of regime change would be illegal, and could not be justified simply for military reasons. A war in Iraq would be unlawful, and internationally unacceptable.
On the matter of "imminence" of an attack, one must remember the '45 minutes to attack' headlines all over the front pages of British newspapers. I remember women, pushing their young toddlers to nursery that morning, scared out of their minds that Britain would be covered in bombs in just 45 minutes. As these groups of mothers walked along discussing the papers, I heard a mother say, "...if they could kill all the children in 45 minutes...we need to do something to protect them and ourselves". The other mothers nodded in sincere aggreement. There was not one dissenter. Everyone was tense that day at receiving the bad news.
The reason I mention this, and the reason why this conversation is very important, is because the whole country seemed to be on 'red alert'.
So we come to the issue of self-defence and "imminence of attack".
Attorney General, Goldsmith advises that force may be used only if "there is an actual and imminent armed attack; use of force is necessary i.e. the only means of preventing an attack; the force used is proportionate".
None of these scenarios were ever the case here.
Goldsmithh goes further and says that "The development of WMD is not in itself sufficient to indicate such imminence". He also tells Blair that there are no grounds for "regarding an Iraq use of WMD as imminent".
In other words, there is no reason to assume that the Iraqis have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), much less have WMD's in "use". WMD's were also not a good enough excuse for the 'self-defence' "imminence" defence to start a war with Iraq. Goldsmith also appears to open up the notion that if the Iraqis had WMD's, they could not 'used' them anyway.
According to military personnel, WMD's cannot be launched 'quickly' and without the world knowing that they are being prepared for launch and attack.
There is some discussion about UN Security resolutions that relate to Kuwait. However, any retrospective or as Goldsmith puts it, "revival" of any of those resolutions as an excuse for war would fit into the "unlawful" camp, where the legality of any war is concerned.
Goldsmith's legal advice is that "A new UN Security Council resolution explicitly authorising the use of force under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter would plainly be the most secure, and preferred, legal basis for military action in the current situation".
Goldsmith discusses the issue of "a material breach of ceasefire conditions the authorisation to use force under resolution 687 revives". It is pointed out that the 'revival' of UN resolution 687 would be limited to only a very short period of time. The resolution was only to be achieved to arrive at a "ceasfire" and nothing else. It should be noted that when it was used in the Kuwait situation, it was controversial then.
The use of UN resolution 1205 during the Kuwait war, was acknowledged. 1205 was used in that case because of Iraq's "cessation of cooperation" with UNSCOM which constituted a "flagrant violation" of ceasefire conditions" and therefore grounds for use of force.
There then follows a discussion about advice Goldsmith received from his predecessors, "John Morris and Charles Falconer". They explicitly tell Goldsmith that there should be a breach of ceasfire conditions and that the Security Council should find those breaches so grave, as to be sufficient to "undermine the basis or effective operation of the ceasefire".
In regards to UN SC resolution 1205 (1998), it did not contain any explicit authority for use of force". The the 'revival' option in both instances di not apply.
The document makes references to "threats to peace...breach of the peace or act of aggression..." and the restoration of international peace and security. It was noted that the Security Council "remained seized of the matter..."
Goldsmith advises explicitly, that resolutions 687, and 1205 cannot legally be relied upon, since (at the time of writing), these resolutions were three years old, and in effect redundant. He then reiterates that the use of force would be "unlawful" without a new Security Council resolution.
Goldsmith talks about giving Iraq an "ultimatum", but says that this would not be a legal basis for any action where use of force is concerned.
Lord Goldsmith closes his letter, with mention of the use of the UK military capabilities (including soldiers lives), and says "we would therefore need to be satisfied in all cases as to the legality of the use of force".
He then copies his letter to the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.
So there we have it, clear evidence, the original legal advice was rigid in its clarity. The Iraq war would be illegal and "unlawful", if there was no new UN Security Council resolution to ensure that "use of force" (war) could be taken with the aggreement of the world.
Therefore, the public now has to ask how we are going to deal with those who were found to have duped the country, and lied to the military, in a bid to grow their personal bank-balances, and their status?
Lets see what Sir John Chilcot comes up with in his recommendations. If he does not hold with the public, if he does not chime with their increasing outrage, as the evidence is exposed. I dread to thing of the back-lash against him, and the whole inquiry team from the public.
